“Mechanisms with Evidence: Commitment and Robustness," with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, Econometrica, March 2019. (Supplemental Appendix.)

“Disclosure and Choice," with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, Review of Economic Studies, July 2018.

“Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification," with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, American Economic Review, December 2014. (Online appendix.)

“Temptation," with Wolfgang Pesendorfer, in Acemoglu, Arellano, and Dekel, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Tenth World Congress, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

“Implementation with Partial Provability," with Elchanan Ben-Porath, Journal of Economic Theory, September 2012.

“Costly Self Control and Random Self Indulgence," with Eddie Dekel, Econometrica, May 2012. (supplemental notes)

“How (Not) to Do Decision Theory," with Eddie Dekel, Annual Review of Economics, 2010.

“Finite Order Implications of Common Priors in Infinite Models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, January 2010.

“Temptation-Driven Preferences," with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, Review of Economic Studies, July 2009.

“Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games," with Ruqu Wang, Games and Economic Behavior, May 2009.

“Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: Corrigendum," with Eddie Dekel, Aldo Rustichini, and Todd Sarver, Econometrica, March 2007. See also supplemental appendix with complete proof of DLR’s additive EU theorem.

“Finite Order Implications of Common Priors," Econometrica, July 2003. (supplemental notes)

“Language and Economics," in N. Dimitri, M. Basili, and I. Gilboa, eds., Cognitive Processes and Rationality in Economics, London: Routledge, 2003.

“Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space," with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, Econometrica, July 2001.

“Comments on Rubinstein’s Economics and Language," September 1999. (This appears in Rubinstein’s book.)

“Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," with Ruqu Wang, Journal of Economic Theory, August 2000.

“Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality," Review of Economic Studies, April 1999.

“Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness," with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, Econometrica, January 1998.

“Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," with James Bergin, Econometrica, July 1996.

“Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," with Duane J. Seppi, Journal of Economic Theory, August 1995.

“How to Decide How to Decide How to … : Modeling Limited Rationality," Econometrica, July 1991.

“Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contribution," with Mark Bagnoli, Review of Economic Studies, October 1989.