Ph.D., Economics, University of Michigan, 1985.
BPS, Radio journalism, Memphis State University, 1980.
Department of Economics Teaching Award, Carnegie Mellon University, 1988.
Graduate Teaching Award, University of Wisconsin, 2001.
Gitner Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching, Boston University, 2004.
Graduate Advisor of the Year, Boston University, 2007, 2010.
Department Chair, Boston University, 2012-July 2018; January 2019-June 30, 2020.
Director of Graduate Studies, Boston University, 2006-2008; 2009-2012.
Director of Graduate Studies, University of Wisconsin, 2001-02.
Co-Editor, Econometrica, 2018- .
Board of Editors, American Economic Review, 2014-2018.
Associate Editor, Theoretical Economics, 2011-2018.
Co-Editor, Theoretical Economics, 2005-2011.
Associate Editor, Econometrica, 2000-2018.
Associate Editor, Mathematical Social Sciences, 1999-2005.
Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior, 1996-2012.
Fellow, Game Theory Society, 2017.
Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, 2011.
Fellow, Econometric Society, 2005.
“Mechanisms with Evidence: Commitment and Robustness,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, Econometrica, 87, March 2019, 529-566.
“Disclosure and Choice,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, Review of Economic Studies, 85, July 2018, 1425-1470.
“Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, American Economic Review, 104, December 2014, 3779-3813. (lead article)
“Implementation with Partial Provability,” with Elchanan Ben-Porath, Journal of Economic Theory, 147, September 2012, 1689-1724.
“Costly Self Control and Random Self Indulgence,” with Eddie Dekel, Econometrica, 80, May 2012, 1271-1302.
“Finite Order Implications of Common Priors in Infinite Models,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46, January 2010, 56-70.
“Temptation-Driven Preferences,” with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, Review of Economic Studies, 76, July 2009, 937-971.
“Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games,” with Ruqu Wang, Games and Economic Behavior, 66, May 2009, 292-314.
“Finite Order Implications of Common Priors,” Econometrica, 71, July 2003, 1255-1267.
“Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space,” with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, Econometrica, 69, July 2001, 891-934.
(See also “Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: Corrigendum,” with Eddie Dekel, Aldo Rustichini, and Todd Sarver, Econometrica, 75, March 2007, 591-600, and “Supplemental Appendix.")
“Regulatory Rule-making with Legal Challenges,” with Devon Garvie, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 40, September 2000, 87-110.
“Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games,” with Ruqu Wang, Journal of Economic Theory, 93, August 2000, 149-190.
“Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, April 1999, 339-361.
“Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness,” with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, Econometrica, 66, January 1998, 159-173.
“Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations,” with James Bergin, Econometrica, 64, July 1996, 943-956.
“Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids,” with Mark Bagnoli, Rand Journal of Economics, 27, Spring 1996, 124-147.
“Ex Ante versus Interim Rationality and the Existence of Bubbles,” with Sugato Bhattacharyya, Economic Theory, 6, Number 4, 1995, 469-494.
“Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability,” with Duane J. Seppi, Journal of Economic Theory, 66, August 1995, 370-405.
“Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 28, February 1995, 42-67. Reprinted in P. Earl, ed., The Legacy of Herbert Simon in Economic Analysis, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001.
“A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality,” Games and Economic Behavior, 6, January 1994, 114-129.
“Private Provision of Public Goods Can Be Efficient,” with Mark Bagnoli, Public Choice, 74, July 1992, 59-78.
“How to Decide How to Decide How to … : Modeling Limited Rationality,” Econometrica, 59, July 1991, 1105-1125.
“Informational Requirements and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games,” with Sanjay Srivastava, Games and Economic Behavior, 2, September 1990, 273-290.
“Delaying and Deterring Entry: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 14, July/October 1990, 685-708.
“Computation as a Correlation Device,” with Sanjay Srivastava, Games and Economic Behavior, 2, June 1990, 154-172.
“Stock Repurchase as a Takeover Defense,” with Mark Bagnoli and Roger Gordon, Review of Financial Studies, 2, Number 3, 1989, 423-443.
“Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions,” with Mark Bagnoli, Review of Economic Studies, 56, October 1989, 583-601.
“Successful Takeovers without Exclusion,” with Mark Bagnoli, Review of Financial Studies, 1, Spring 1988, 89-110.
“Cooperation among Egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken Games,” Public Choice, 51, Number 3, 1986, 315-331.
Conference Volumes, Book Chapters, Etc.
“Temptation,” with Wolfgang Pesendorfer, in Acemoglu, Arellano, and Dekel, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Tenth World Congress, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
“How (Not) to Do Decision Theory,” with Eddie Dekel, Annual Review of Economics, Volume 2, 2010, 257-282.
“Robert W. Rosenthal (1944-2002),” in S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
“Unforeseen Contingencies,” in S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume, eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
“Language and Economics,” in N. Dimitri, M. Basili, and I. Gilboa, eds., Cognitive Processes and Economic Behaviour, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 75-94.
“Recent Developments in Modeling Unforeseen Contingencies,” with Eddie Dekel and Aldo Rustichini, European Economic Review, 42, 1998, 523-542.
“Logics for Non-Omniscient Agents: An Axiomatic Approach,” in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin, eds., Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1997, 193-216.
“An Axiomatic Approach to the Logical Omniscience Problem,” in R. Fagin, ed., Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Fifth Conference, San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1994.
“On the Strategic Advantages of a Lack of Common Knowledge,” in R. Parikh, ed., Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Third Conference, San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1990.
Reviews and Comments
Review of Gilboa’s Theory of Decision under Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Literature, 48, March 2010. Review of Gigerenzer and Selten’s Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, Journal of Economic Literature, September 2002.
“Comments on Economics and Language,” in A. Rubinstein’s Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
“Dedication: In Honor of Robert J. Aumann,” International Journal of Game Theory, August 1999.
“More Absentmindedness,” Games and Economic Behavior, 20, July 1997.
“Comments on Bicchieri: `The Epistemic Foundations of Nash Equilibrium',” in D. Little, ed., On the Reliability of Economic Models, Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 1995.
Review of Rationality and Coordination, by Cristina Bicchieri, Games and Economic Behavior, 9, May 1995.
Review of Frontiers of Game Theory, editted by Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, Southern Economic Journal, 61, April 1995.
Review of The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, by Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, Journal of Economic Literature, December 1987.
“Dynamic Behavior of a Firm Subject to Stochastic Regulatory Review: A Comment,” International Economic Review, June 1985, 511-516.
“Mechanism Design for Acquisition of/Stochastic Evidence," with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel, first preliminary draft September 2019, current draft August 2021.
“An Elementary Proof of the Optimality of Threshold Mechanisms," first draft June 2015, current draft July 2015.
“Why is Language Vague?," current draft, November 2009.
Member, Council of Game Theory Society, 2008-2013.
Program Committee, 10th World Congress of the Econometric Society, 2010.
Program Chair, Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings, 2009.
Program Committee, Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings, 2008.
Program Committee, 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, 2005.
Program Committee, Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, 1994, 2001, 2005.
Member of National Science Foundation prescreening panel for Learning and Intelligent Systems, 1997.
National Science Foundation, 1985-1986, 2002-2005, 2005-2008, 2009-2012, and 2019-2022.
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation, 1999-2001, 2007-2010, 2013-2017, and 2019-2023.
American Economic Review
American Political Science Review
B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics
Canadian Journal of Economics
Discrete Event Dynamic Systems: Theory and Applications
Economics and Philosophy
European Journal of Operational Research
European Research Council
Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l’Aide a la Recherche
Games and Economic Behavior
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
International Economic Review
International Journal of Game Theory
Israel Science Foundation
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Journal of Economic Theory
Journal of Economics
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Journal of the European Economic Association
Journal of Industrial Economics
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Journal of Philosophical Logic
Journal of Political Economy
Journal of Public Economics
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Mathematical Social Sciences
National Science Foundation
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Rand Journal of Economics
Research in Ecnomics (Richerche Economiche)
Review of Economic Studies
Review of Financial Studies
Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Southern Economic Journal
Theory and Decision
United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation
Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review, 2018.
Edited special issue of International Journal of Game Theory, August 1999.
Seminars and Conference Presentations, Last Five Years
Conference on Game Theory and its Applications to Humanities, Social Science and Natural Science, Korean Institute for Advanced Studies, December 2016.
University of Chicago, May 2017.
Stockholm School of Economics, June 2017.
Penn State University, September 2017.
University of New South Wales, November 2017.
University of Technology Sydney, November 2017.
Australian National University, November 2017.
Hitotsubashi University, November 2017.
Osaka University, November 2017.
Kyoto University, November 2017.
University of Montreal, December 2017.
Cowles Foundation Conference on Economic Theory, Yale University, June 2018.
Warwick Theory Workshop, Warwick University, June 2018.
Paris School of Economics, June 2018.
MIT, September 2018.
Queen’s University, September 2018.
Duke University, October 2018.
Texas Economic Theory Camp, Keynote Lecture, Southern Methodist University, October 2018.
National University of Singapore, November 2018.
Columbia University, April 2019.
University of Bonn, June 2019.
Humboldt University of Berlin, June 2019.
Arizona State University, September 2019.
University College London, October 2019.
Cambridge University, October 2019.
London School of Economics, October 2019.
CIREQ Montreal Microeconomic Theory Conference, November 2019.
Caltech, November 2019.
UCLA, November 2019.
Brown University, February 2020.
Virginia Tech, November 2020.
University of Maryland, November 2020.
University of Texas, November 2020.
Brandeis University, December 2020.
Baylor University, March 2021.
Princeton University, April 2021.
Yale University, May 2021.
Cornell University, May 2021.
Last updated, August 2, 2021.